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The use of counterfactuals for considerations of algorithmic
fairness and explainability is gaining prominence within the
machine learning community and industry. This paper argues
for more caution with the use of counterfactuals when the
facts to be considered are social categories such as race or
gender. We review a broad body of papers from philosophy
and social sciences on social ontology and the semantics of
counterfactuals, and we conclude that the counterfactual ap-
proach in machine learning fairness and social explainability
can require an incoherent theory of what social categories are.
Our findings suggest that most often the social categories may
not admit counterfactual manipulation, and hence may not
appropriately satisfy the demands for evaluating the truth or
falsity of counterfactuals. This is important because the wide-
spread use of counterfactuals in machine learning can lead to
misleading results when applied in high-stakes domains. Ac-
cordingly, we argue that even though counterfactuals play an
essential part in some causal inferences, their use for questions
of algorithmic fairness and social explanations can create more
problems than they resolve. Our positive result is a set of tenets
about using counterfactuals for fairness and explanations in
machine learning.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The use of counterfactuals has become increasingly popular
in the machine learning community for many reasons such
as making sense of algorithmic fairness or explainability in
automated decision-making for consequential social contexts
[4, 9, 14, 18, 29, 35, 42, 47, 51]. As a result, machine learning
algorithms coupled with counterfactuals could be used for
making high-stakes decisions with ethical and legal impacts
in domains such as insurance, predictive policing, and hiring.
Despite this widespread attention and use, there is a surprising
lack of engagement with the long-standing philosophical
and social scientific literature on the required ontological
and semantic conditions for an appropriate application of
counterfactuals.
What is a counterfactual? Consider X and Y to represent
events or facts and the following chain of occurrences “X and
Y”, where X precedes Y in time. A counterfactual analysis can
help to find whether X is a cause of Y by supposing the non-
occurrence of X and seeking for the effect of this supposition on
Y. This corresponds to evaluating whether the counterfactual
‘If X had not occurred, Y would not have occurred.’ is true. In
machine learning practice, there are several technical ways
to generate and evaluate counterfactuals, such as feature-
based explanations, prototype explanations, example-based
explanations, or causal explanations [19, 32, 35, 38, 46, 50, 51].
These approaches are most often rooted, implicitly or explicitly,
in either of the two prominent conceptual approaches for
evaluating counterfactuals: the close-enough-possible-worlds
approach inspired by Lewis [36] and Stalnaker [49], and the
causal modeling approach developed by Spirtes et al. [48] and
Pearl [44], among others.1
To evaluate a counterfactual, the close-enough-possible-
worlds approach compares the actual world in which X and Y
occur with those similar-enough worlds to the actual world
in which X does not occur (e.g., comparing a data instance
1Strictly speaking, [36, 49] develop the closest-possible-worlds approach to make
sense of counterfactuals. With a bit of weakening, the (set of) closest-possible-
world(s) can be interpreted as the (set of) close-enough-possible-world(s), where
due to practical considerations those possible worlds that are close enough to
the actual world (rather than the closest possible worlds) are selected. For a
recent alternative to evaluating conditionals relative to a causal model see [1].
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to a similar data instance or to a prototype when generat-
ing example-based or prototype explanations, respectively,
requires comparison with respect to some notion of enough
similarity). If in those worlds Y does not occur the coun-
terfactual is considered true and X is deemed the cause of
Y; otherwise, the counterfactual is deemed false. The close-
enough-possible-worlds account has been mainly used in
discussions of counterfactual explanations in machine learn-
ing and the causal modeling approach has been widely applied
for examining fairness counterfactually. Although these two
semantic accounts are very different, the following abstract
recipe is common to both for the evaluation of counterfactuals.
First, determine the facts to be kept fixed under counterfactual
variation. Second, vary the antecedent. Third, determine the
influence of the variation on the consequent.
In this paper, we explore the ontological and epistemological-
semantic conditions required for using either of the two con-
ceptual approaches for an appropriate application of coun-
terfactuals to ethical machine learning, in particular to algo-
rithmic fairness and social explanations. We argue that in
some cases, the lack of a right grounding of the elements of a
counterfactual into the social world can lead to their misuse
in machine learning applications. We review a broad body of
papers from philosophy and social sciences on the ontology
of social categories and conclude that the counterfactual ap-
proach in machine learning fairness and social explainability
might require an incoherent theory of what some social cate-
gories such as race are. Our findings suggest that despite its
appeal for convenient analysis of fairness and social explana-
tions, most often the social categories may not admit an apt
counterfactual intervention, and hence may not appropriately
satisfy the required assumptions for evaluating the truth or
falsity of counterfactuals. Accordingly, we argue that even
though counterfactuals play an essential part in some causal
inferences, their use in discussions of algorithmic fairness
and social explanations can create more problems than they
resolve.
Related work and novelty. Before we go further, we would
like to explicitly contrast our paper in more detail with related
work to highlight its novelty. There are four main closely re-
lated works on this topic which explicitly or implicitly critique
counterfactual theories of social causation in decision-making
contexts. Kohler-Hausmann [34] argues that the counterfac-
tual causal model is wrong for detecting discrimination in
both law and social science. Building on this idea, Hu and
Kohler-Hausmann [30] argue that perhaps we need to use a
formal model other than causal models (such as constitutive
diagrams) for detecting discrimination. Hanna et al. [23] use
critical race theory and argue that the multi-dimensionality of
race should be taken into account whenever this phenomenon
becomes relevant to the machine learning community, and
challenges practitioners to explicitly ask who is doing the
categorizing and for what purpose? Barocas et al. [4] discuss
the mapping of the explanatory features to actions in the world
when using feature-highlighting explanations. We share the
perspective of these authors. However, the novelty of our con-
tribution is threefold. (1) We provide a conceptual analysis of
the vagueness of the notion of ‘similarity’, rooted in the close-
enough-possible-worlds approach. This approach is the con-
ceptual basis of feature-based, prototype, and example-based
analytic methods for examining counterfactuals by machine
learning community. The notion of similarity is used in almost
all conceptions of counterfactual explanations or fairness as
referenced. To the best of our knowledge, the philosophical-
conceptual basis [36, 37, 49] and assumptions required to
assess the ‘similarity’ of counterfactual worlds/scenarios are
not properly examined in the machine learning literature, yet
‘similarity’ is used, implicitly or explicitly, for making sense
of counterfactual explanations or fairness. (2) We go beyond
the mere criticism of causal modeling as applied to the social
domain, and consider counterfactuals more generally by ex-
amining both the close-enough-possible-worlds account and
causal modeling. We think that just a critique of manipulating
social categories is not sufficient because in disciplines such
as medicine and public health, the use of protected attributes
such as race or gender are considered to be an ethically accept-
able component of research (e.g., prostate cancer screening
[5, 21]).2 (3) We provide positive results in terms of a set of
detailed tenets as summarized in table 1, showing that any
trace of a counterfactually fair or explainable algorithm (in
a social context) involves making several choices and value
judgments. To that end, the implicit presumptions, choices,
and value judgments must be made as explicit and obvious as
possible by using table 1. No related work does (1) – (3).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2,
we examine the two prominent approaches to modeling and
evaluating counterfactuals, the close-enough-possible-worlds
and the causal modeling approaches, in more detail. In Section
3, we discuss the use of counterfactuals for analyzing fairness
and social explanations in machine learning practice before
raising ontological and epistemological-semantic problems
from this use in Section 4. In Section 5, we suggest a set of
tenets about the use of counterfactuals in machine learning.




Consider the following counterfactuals: (1) If Suzy had not
thrown the rock, the window would not have shattered. (2) If
Nora had not been Latina, she would not have been denied ad-
mission. Are these counterfactuals true or false? Does ‘Suzy’s
throwing the rock’ cause ‘the shattering of the window’? Does
‘Nora’s being Latina’ cause ‘denying admission’? There are
two prominent approaches to evaluate counterfactuals, the
close-enough-possible-worlds approach that is mainly used
in the discussions of social counterfactual explanations [51],
2We are not promoting this use. We just report that in medicine, economics,
public health and other related disciplines, the use of protected classes such
as race or gender sometimes is the basis of development or allocation of some
resources.
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and the causal modeling approach that is at the center of dis-
cussions about counterfactual fairness [35].3 We present these
two semantic approaches independently, though we must
mention that, theoretically speaking, the relationship between
the two is not that straightforward [7]. For the lack of space,
we cannot go into the differential details in this paper. But we
translate this lack of straightforward connection between the
two semantic approaches into our set of principles for using
counterfactuals in machine learning research.
According to the closest-possible-worlds view [36, 49], a
counterfactual can be treated syntactically and semantically via
a variant of a modal logic for counterfactuals. The evaluation
of the counterfactual X Y (if X had occurred, Y would have
occurred) requires the specification of a set of possible worlds
in which X occurs. If in these possible worlds Y also occurs, the
counterfactual X Y is true. These possible worlds must be
ordered in terms of comparative similarity or closeness to the
actual world (in which X occurs and Y occurs). For instance, if
in all the worlds which are close enough to the actual world
except that Suzy does not throw the rock, the window does
not shatter, then Suzy’s throw is the cause of the shattering of
the window. If in all the close-enough-possible-worlds to the
actual world in which Nora is not Latina, she is not denied
admission, then Nora’s being Latina is the cause of her rejection.
The close-enough-possible-worlds approach to the evaluation
of counterfactuals requires an ordering of the possible worlds
in terms of similarity to the actual world. In Section 4, we
discuss that the notion of similarity is inherently vague and that
the similarity ordering can be done in many different ways. As
a result, depending on the choices for the similarity criteria and
the ordering, we can obtain contradictory judgments about
the truth or falsity of counterfactuals. Hence, the vagueness
and the multiplicity of orderings pertain to the problems of
using counterfactuals in machine learning.
A causal modeling approach uses a causal model as a rep-
resentational tool for exploring the space of alternative causal
hypothesis. Following Pearl [44], from a causal modeling per-
spective, the world is described in terms of random variables
and their values. The random variables are either exogenous
or endogenous, and they might take continuous or categorical
values. The exogenous variables (𝒰) are determined by factors
outside of the causal model, and serve as fixed background
assumptions to the causal reasoning. The endogenous vari-
ables (𝒱) may have a causal influence on each other. This
influence is modeled by a set of structural equations ℱ that
are functions for capturing the potential causal effects of func-
tional dependencies on the endogenous variables. A set of
exogenous and endogenous variables, their values, and a set
of structural equations form a causal modelℳ=(𝒰,𝒱,ℱ ).ℳ
can be graphically visualized by a directed acyclic graph. This
graph facilitates cognitive efforts in thinking about potential
causal sources, effects, and causal relations. In such a graph, a
node represents a random variable and an edge between each
pair of nodes represents a direct causal relation between the
3Kilbertus et al. [33] use causal models to analyze fairness. We focus our
discussion on Kusner et al. [35], but our criticism also applies to their work.
corresponding random variables; for instance, X is a direct
cause (parent) of Y is represented by X→ Y. Nodes with no
incoming edge are said to be exogenous.
To find causal relations via a causal model requires es-
tablishing well-defined connections between some aspects
of the sample data and a causal model [44, 48]. The main
connections are often captured by two causal assumptions,
the causal Markov condition and faithfulness. The causal
Markov condition ensures that a variable is independent of
its non-descendants given its parents. The causal faithfulness
condition requires that all inter-dependencies in the observa-
tional data are non-accidental and structural, the result of the
structure of the causal graph. To counterfactually think via
a causal modeling approach in a specific machine learning
domain requires an in-depth interpretation of the mapping
of the random variables on the elements of the domain and
the satisfaction of the causal assumptions. If the domain of
counterfactual thinking occurs at the level of the social world,
we require an apt interpretation of the mapping of the random
variables on social categories, the relationship between them,
and the meaning of causal assumptions applied to the relevant
categories. So far, we have provided a discussion of the two
most prominent semantic approaches to the evaluation of
counterfactuals. In the next section, we give two examples of
the use of counterfactuals in machine learning: in understand-
ing fairness (via causal modeling) [35] and in understanding
social explanations (via the closest-possible-worlds) [51].
3 COUNTERFACTUALS IN ETHICAL
MACHINE LEARNING
3.1 Counterfactual fairness
Discussions about the treatment of fairness in machine learning
systems have primarily taken place in relation to a group or
the individual level. To achieve group fairness, a (statistical)
measure must compare a predictor’s behavior across different
protected demographic groups, and then seeks for approxi-
mate parity of some desirable statistical measure across the
groups [8, 25]. On the other hand, a measure of individual
fairness must compare a predictor’s behavior across similar
individuals [11, 31]. To date, the most popular proposal for
making sense of individual fairness has been the use of causal
modeling for interpreting individual fairness in a counterfac-
tual way [35]. Kusner et al. [35] define a fair predictor to be the
one that gives the same prediction had the individual were
different, for example, had the individual been of another race
or gender. This demands an implicit assumption that other
features and properties (except for the tweaked category in
the causal model) remain the same for that individual. More
precisely, Kusner et al. (2017) gives the following definition:
counterfactual fairness “captures the intuition that a decision
is fair towards an individual if it is the same in (a) the actual
world and (b) a counterfactual world where the individual
belonged to a different demographic group.”
Consider a prediction-based problem characterized in terms
of A (a set of protected attributes), X (a set of non-protected
attributes), and Y (the prediction output). To put this problem
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Figure 1: A causal model for a fair predictor adapted from
[35].
into a causal modeling schema requires fixing U, the set of
exogenous variables. Following [35], the definition of counter-
factual fairness for the predictor Ŷ stipulates the satisfaction
of the following condition for X=x and A=a, for all y, and any
value a′ attainable by A:
P(ŶA←a(U)=y|X=x,A=a)=P(ŶA←a′ (U)=y|X=x,A=a′)
To make matters more concrete, we focus on an example
of a machine learning system, as discussed by [35], employ-
ing a predictor Ŷ to decide who should be admitted to law
school based on its prediction of potential student’s first year
grade (figure 1). The algorithm makes the prediction according
to knowledge about the following attributes of individuals:
gender, race, GPA, and law school entrance exam (LSAT).
According to [35], the set of sensitive attributes are A {sex,
race}, and the non-sensitive ones are X {GPA, law school en-
trance exam}. Moreover, there is a causal link set between
the attributes and the prediction of potential student’s first
year grade. To make this classifier fair, the following question
should be answered: what would the predictor have predicted,
if the individual had a different race (a different sensitive
attribute)? This use of counterfactuals requires assuming a
single change (race) or a limited set of changes (such as sex
and race) to an individual, and then evaluate the probabilistic
condition above given the supposition that everything else
remains the same for that individual. Although the proposal
might sound simple, in the next section we discuss the prob-
lems pertaining to this proposal such as requiring commitment
to a peculiar conception of race as well as controversial views
about the integrity of what an individual (or the perception of
an individual) is, for the purpose of satisfying the convenient
requirements of counterfactual modeling and evaluation. Or,
to understand what counterfactual fairness is, we first need
to make choices about which counterfactual worlds to con-
sider and the basis by which the closeness of counterfactual
worlds (including the knowledge of how a counterfactually
different version of the target individuals) to the actual world
is specified.
3.2 Social counterfactual explanation
Counterfactual explanations are claimed to be among the
most popular types of explanations for opaque algorithmic
decisions [51]. For instance, let us assume Nora has applied for
a mortgage and her application is denied via an algorithmic
system. A counterfactual explanation for this denial can be:
If Nora’s annual income had been $60,000, she would have
received the loan. As a matter of fact, Nora is denied a loan
and her annual income is $40,000. Or consider the following
counterfactual explanation: If Nora had not been Latina, she
would not have been denied the loan. As a matter of fact,
Nora is denied a loan and she is Latina. This is an instance
that requires making a putative plausible assumption about a
different version of Nora (with only a different race, everything
else equal to the original version of Nora), and then trust the
validity of this explanation.
In the next section, we offer two main arguments challeng-
ing a counterfactual approach to algorithmic fairness and
social explanations when the things that require counterfac-
tual supposition are social categories such as gender, sexual
orientation, or race in terms of which (the uniqueness of) a
person is characterized.
4 TWO PROBLEMS
In this section, we specify two sets of problems, ontological
and epistemological-semantic, that one faces upon attempting
to construct a fair or explainable classifier which incorporates
the counterfactual supposition of social categories such as
race and gender, as sketched in Section 3. The problems arise
in the attempts to answer the following questions: what are
the objects of manipulation? Which counterfactual worlds are
similar enough to the actual world or whose causal model’s
perspective should we care about?
4.1 What is manipulated?
There has been a long standing debate among several disci-
plines such as philosophy, sociology, law and epidemiology
about the causal effects of social categories such as race and
gender [12, 16, 34, 41]. To counterfactually suppose a social
attribute of an individual requires first specifying what the
social categories are and what it means to suppose a different
version of an individual with the counterfactually manipu-
lated social property. This counterfactual question amounts to
asking, ”what if person X had not been ”race Y” or ”gender
Z”?
There are several competing contemporary schools of thought
about what social categories are, and our review here is merely
representative of some and by no means exhaustive. In the
rest of this section, we take ‘race’ as a prototypical instance of
the social categories of interest to counterfactual manipulation.
With some modifications, similar arguments can be made
about other social categories such as gender.
Roughly, we can distinguish between three major positions
about what race is [39, 40]. The geo-biological essentialism
about race largely signifies dividing humans into a sufficiently
small, discrete number of categories, usually for the purposes
of colonial conquest, enslavement or domination of one group
over another [10]. The categorization has been based on some
kind of biological foundation (e.g., modern genes) essential
to humans, and inherited from one generation to another.
This conception of race identifies some geo-biological features
(such as skin color, hair texture, and eye form) that are only
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common to the members of a racial group, usually from a
specific geographical region. The geo-biological conception of
race has been questioned extensively, and has been critically
challenged by scientific and philosophical arguments ranging
from denying that the concept of race has any biological
foundations to denying the very existence of races. Some
also have argued that this biologically essentialist view about
race cannot be separated from the political project of racial
oppression, domination and disenfranchisement [10, 23]. In
addition to the geo-biological ancestry conception of race,
there are two other major views about the ontology of race.
On the one hand, racial skeptics argue for the falsity of
naturalism about race and conclude that no type of race exists
[2, 3, 20, 52–54]. They claim that the natural candidates for the
bases of race such as geography, phenotypes, and geneology
fail according to scientific findings. The normative implications
of this ontological view is to entirely disregard the existence
of race. On the other hand, racial constructivists dismiss the
conception of biological race, but argue that the concept of
race must be preserved for the purpose of social movements
and affirmative action to abolish social and structural injustice.
How so? One of the most influential proponents of racial
constructivism, Haslanger [15, 26, 27], suggests a group-based
understanding of race marked by ancestry and appearance
and by hierarchical relations of power for the purposes of fighting
against social injustice. This conception of race finds using ‘race’
as a justifiable entity for the purpose of resisting and combating
racism. Other than that, racial identification by the dominant
group constrains the autonomy of individuals by requiring
them to be what a specific racial group signifies from the
point of view of who has defined it. Social constructivism
hence maintains that a social category – be it racial, gender,
or class – was brought into existence or shaped by historical
events, social forces, political power, or colonial conquest, all of
which could have been very different [6, 12, 20]. Being a social
constructivist about race and gender means that one does
not subscribe to the view that race and gender are natural or
biological categories with permanent or immutable properties.
In other words, for such a constructivist, the term ‘race’ cannot
refer to an essentially biological attribute such as skin tone, a
genetically produced trait, or a signifier that people just have
and thereby obviously belong to a designated racial group
[34].
Kusner et al. [35] claim that it is counterproductive to assume
social categories such as race cannot be causes because we can
design experiments on such categories by intervening on a
particular aspect of the attribute ‘race’, such as ‘race perception’.
We disagree. We think this claim only serves to justify the
convenient assumptions required for causal modeling (i.e., that
conception of race is amenable to counterfactual manipulation).
As we have shown above, there is no universally agreed-upon
perception of race. To be able to talk about the causal effect of
social categories, we first need to specify what these categories
are. For instance, we might be justified in first having a robust
social ontology informed by critical theory [28]. Only after
this exploration, we are able to discuss what our perception of
race is. As we have seen, there is a plurality of responses to
this question, and our response depends on the perspective
we adopt about this matter.
Recall that an algorithm that subscribes to counterfactual
fairness requires evaluating the actual non-occurrence of X
with the supposition that X did occur. For example, we should
replace the actual person (or our perception thereof) who has a
protected attribute, such as being Latina, with a counterfactual
version of the same person who has a different protected
attribute, such as being white, to test whether the algorithm
makes the same prediction about the actual person (or our
perception thereof) and the counterfactual person. What view
about race (or perception of race) does it require to suppose
that racial category non-Latina for the counterfactual version
of person i knowing that Latina is the real feature of person i?
Counterfactual fairness (or counterfactual social explanation)
requires us to force a random variable to take a certain value.
Is the required counterfactual suppositions for designing a
fair algorithm compatible with the views about race specified
above?
Racial skepticism is ruled out as an alternative of commit-
ments held by the proponents of counterfactual fairness or
counterfactual social explanations due to its denial of the very
existence of such categories. Social constructivism makes sense
of race for the purposes of fighting against social injustice. Hence,
the constructivist ontology of race has, in addition, a purpose-
relative reality that the algorithm must reflect in its reasoning
and arguably is not subject to counterfactual variation separate
from the scope of the fight against social injustice. Perhaps
the only viable theory of race that remains for counterfactual
fairness requires commitment to a reductionist view about
social categories such as race or gender as biological attributes.
Several scholars have argued that this commitment is deeply
problematic (see, for instance, [34]). We share this perspec-
tive for several decision contexts. This purely reductionist
understanding of social categories as essential and physical
attributes, in addition to being scientifically outdated, fails
the task of robust objectivity, and might indirectly widen and
exaggerate the problematic associations between the sensitive
attributes that are the result of social and structural injustice
in the first place.
4.2 Similarity between worlds and the view
from somewhere
Is there an objective view from nowhere form which to assess
the validity of counterfactuals? In this section, we raise some
epistemological-semantic problems for comparing and select-
ing the set of counterfactual possible worlds that are close
enough to the actual world.
First, we focus on the problem of inherent vagueness associ-
ated with similarity between possible worlds. Counterfactual
scenarios in counterfactual worlds stand in contrast to actual
scenarios in actual worlds. To evaluate a counterfactual re-
quires a comparison between an actual world and a set of
sufficiently similar counterfactual worlds to the actual world.
The counterfactual X Y is true just in case it takes less of a
departure from the actual world to make X true along with
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Y than to make X true without Y. But, which counterfactual
worlds? The number of counterfactual worlds is myriad (per-
haps even uncountably infinite). Lewis and Stalnaker [36, 49]
emphasize that the counterfactual worlds of interest to the
actual world are the ones that are the most similar to the actual
world. In some cases of comparing natural features between
worlds, it is possible to arrive at a consensus for the ordering of
similar worlds. However, in many cases the vagueness of this
notion is problematic and counterintuitive for the evaluation
of counterfactuals [17]. Lewis [37] provides some guidance to
ordering possible worlds: (1) avoid big widespread violations
of the laws of nature of the actual world, (2) maximize the
spatiotemporal perfect match of particular matters of fact, (3)
avoid small, localized violations of the laws of nature of the ac-
tual world, and (4) secure approximate similarity of particular
matters of fact. But, how to translate these considerations to
the social domain? Further research is required to understand
how to avoid big widespread violations of commitments to
our ontological views about social categories in the possible
worlds framework.
The ordering of similar worlds faces severe problems be-
cause for some ordinary counterfactuals, some irrelevant pos-
sible worlds end up determining the counterfactuals’ truth
values. Also, depending on what kind of possible worlds we
choose, we might end up assigning a different truth-value to a
counterfactual statement. To make the matters more concrete,
consider the following counterfactual [13] (3) If Nixon had
pressed the button, then there would have been a nuclear
holocaust. A similarity-based approach requires the following
truth-evaluation: (3) is true if and only if the worlds most
similar to the actual world in which Nixon pressed the button,
there was a nuclear holocaust. But the worlds in which there
is a nuclear holocaust are drastically different from the actual
world: the entire future history of humanity would be different
in such a world. This example points to the difficulties we face
in making judgments about the ordering of possible worlds.
The causal modeling approach for interpreting counterfac-
tuals builds on Lewis’s ordering of similar worlds. However,
it appeals to the cognitive architecture of the human mind in
order to resolve the arbitrariness of assumptions about the
ordering of the counterfactual worlds. Pearl [45] argues that
to make sense of the notion of "similarity" we should rely on
the fact that we experience the same world and share the same
mental model of its causal structure. However, relying on a
largely speculative psychological theory of how the human
mind handles the infinity of possible counterfactual worlds
does not resolve the normative and ethical implications of
choosing which possible worlds are the most similar to the
actual world.
Indeed, different epistemic view points might suggest dif-
ferent ordering of possible worlds. After all, humans differ
extensively in the standpoints from which they observe the
world, and these standpoints influence the formation of causal
mental models [24]. From an abstract point of view, a causal
model is specified according to a set of nodes, edges, and
assumptions. What these nodes and edges represent and how
they are interpreted suggest a particular standpoint about the
organization of world from the view point of the causal model.
The crucial point to remember is that no causal model captures
absolutely objective relations in the world. Depending on the
convenient assumptions for a causal model, X can be counter-
factually dependent on Y in one model but not in another [22].
These convenient assumptions specifying the causal model
might enforce some false perceptions about the social world
(at the risk of being seriously wrong). This suggests that there
is always a view from somewhere, as opposed to a more ob-
jective and universal “view from nowhere” [43] from which
we can assess whether a counterfactual is assertible.
5 RESULTS OF OUR ANALYSIS
So far, we have argued that the use of counterfactuals in fair
and explainable machine learning is not straightforward, and
that there are various trade-offs and value judgments essen-
tial to the use of counterfactuals for ethical machine learning.
Examination of all these assumptions produces awareness
about various trade-offs, value judgments, or potential harms
of using or misusing counterfactuals. Therefore, to aptly use
counterfactuals requires bringing forth all implicit and un-
specified assumptions about the ontology of the categories on
which we run counterfactual analysis as well as the epistemic
and the interpretational issues pertaining to the evaluation
of counterfactuals. Examination of all these assumptions pro-
duces awareness about some unexpected potential harms that
can result from the laudable goals of fair and explainable
machine learning.
In this section, we offer strategies for specifying and reflect-
ing on the hidden ontological and epistemological-semantic
assumptions through an interdisciplinary conversation. We
summarize the results of our study (Table 1) by suggesting a
detailed set of tenets to check and reflect upon before apply-
ing counterfactuals to fair and explainable machine learning.
Following this set of tenets would enable modellers and algo-
rithmic designers to state unspecified and implicit assumptions
about social ontology as explicitly as possible. It also suggests
a path to researchers for seeking a variety of justifications in
seeing the social world through a counterfactual lens, and to
become aware of some potential harms and disadvantages of
making sense of fairness and explanations counterfactually.
Our results are a necessary step to perform before designing
and applying some putative counterfactually fair or explain-
able algorithms to social contexts.
Table 1 has three columns. The first column provides a
category of different kinds of presumptions and choices (onto-
logical and epistemological-semantic) which are necessary to
examine before designing and applying counterfactually fair
and explainable algorithms. The second column provides the
set of questions to ask and answer for articulating the implicit
set of assumptions in column one as explicit as possible. The
third column gives an exemplar of the questions to answer in
the context of a particular social problem.
Recall the counterfactual “If Nora had not been Latina, she
would not have been denied admission.”
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Assumption Question Example
Ontological perspective What are the social categories? What is race (or gender)?
Ontological choice What ontological perspective do we
choose to adopt, and why?
Among different views, what do
we take race to be? Social construc-
tivism? Geo-biological ancestry con-
ception of race? why?
Ontological knowledge How do we know about the social
categories?
Who do we consult about the con-
ception of race?
Semantic choice Close-enough-possible-worlds or
causal modeling? What is the jus-
tification?
Why do we choose either of these se-
mantic approaches to counterfactu-
ally suppose that Nora is not Latina?
How is our choice justified?
Evaluation reliability What happens to the truth value of
the counterfactuals of interest if we
change the semantic approach? How
robust is the truth value of the coun-
terfactual when moving from a close-
enough-possible-worlds approach to
causal modeling?
Is the truth value for “If Nora had
not been Latina, she would not have
been denied admission.” differ when
we choose the semantic approach?
Similarity choice How do we choose what similarity
means in this context?
What do we sacrifice by supposing
a particular cluster of similar worlds
(rather than other possible clusters
of similar worlds) in which an indi-
vidual is the same except for their
race?
Comparison criteria What are our chosen criteria for com-
paring the similar worlds of interests
to the actual world? Are these criteria
socially warranted?
What characterization for compar-
ing similar worlds justifies keeping
(almost) everything about a person
fixed except for their race? What does
this socially mean?
Idealization What do we miss by translating
social categories into random vari-
ables?
What is left out by translating an in-
dividual’s race to a random variable?
Context How do these categories operate in
the world?
How does race function in the world?
Does this conflict with the assump-
tions necessary for counterfactual
manipulation of race?
Ethical and social harm Does our ontological preference gen-
erate harms in relation to social
justice (combating structural injus-
tices)?
Does our ontological preference for
what race is generate harms in rela-
tion to combating racial injustice?
Table 1: Any use of a counterfactually fair or explainable algorithm (in a social context) involves making several ontological,
semantic and ethical choices and judgments. These implicit presumptions, choices, and judgments must be made as explicit
and obvious as possible.
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Here are the ontological assumptions that should become ex-
plicit. First, an explicit statement of the ontological perspective
the algorithmic system is adopting. To tweak “being Latina”
the designers of the system need to specify what race (e.g.,
Latina) from their perspective is. Second, the designers could
discover whether a counterfactual approach inadvertently
commits them to a problematic social ontology. They could
provide morally and politically appropriate justifications for
why, among other options, they choose and adopt this ontolog-
ical perspective about race. Is it because this conception of race
is compatible with some simplistic assumptions about social
ontology that are required to use a causal modeling approach?
What are the genuine reasons for this choice, in relation to
respecting intellectual humility for what we know about race
from other disciplines? Third, the assumptions about ontolog-
ical knowledge should become explicit. For instance, who do
we consult about a theory of race, and why?
The epistemological-semantic presumptions and choices
that must be made explicit are as follows. First, what is the
semantic choice? Will we choose a close-enough-possible-
worlds or causal modeling approach? What is the justification
for this choice? Does our choice make a difference to the truth
evaluation of the counterfactual for this particular context of
employment such as Nora not being Latina? Second, how do
we account for the evaluation of reliability? How robust is
the truth value of the counterfactual when moving from a
close-enough-possible-worlds approach to causal modeling?
For instance, is the truth value of “If Nora had not been
Latina, she would not have been denied admission.” differ
when we choose either of the semantic approaches? Third,
how do we decide about the meaning of similarity in the
particular context of employment? What do we sacrifice by
supposing a particular cluster of similar worlds (rather than
other possible cluster of similar worlds) in which an individual
is the same except for their race? Or if we are specifying that
everything that is not causally dependent on the tweaked
category should remain constant, how do we know what is not
causally dependent? Fourth, what are our chosen criteria for
comparing the possible similar worlds of interest to the actual
world? Are these criteria socially warranted? For instance,
what characterization for comparing similar worlds justifies
keeping almost everything about a person fixed except for
their race? What does this socially mean? Fifth, there are
questions about the translation of social categories such as
race into random variables that can be appropriately treated
by an algorithm, if the semantic choice is causal modeling.
What is left out if we translate the conception of race into
random variables? Does that matter? Why or why not? Sixth,
there are questions about the choice of context. How do social
categories (such as race) operate in the world? Does this
conflict with the required assumptions for counterfactual
manipulation of race? Finally, there are questions about some
ethical harms that can result from the use of counterfactual
analysis. Does our ontological preference generate harms in
relation to some desired social justice agenda? For example,
does our ontological preference for what race is generate harms
in relation to some affirmative action plans for combating racial
injustice?
In sum, Table 1 shows that any trace of a counterfactually
fair or explainable algorithm (in a social context) involves
making several choices and presumptions. By following these
tenets, computer scientists can discuss the validity and the im-
plications of these choices in accordance with other disciplines
such as philosophy, social sciences, and anthropology. To that
end, the implicit presumptions and choices will be made as
explicit and obvious as possible, and an interdisciplinary con-
versation can result in concluding whether the counterfactuals
should be used in the generation of explanations and fairness
in machine learning practice.
6 CONCLUSION
Counterfactuals are increasingly applied in machine learning,
for example in designing fair and explainable algorithms.
This paper provides a detailed set of principles, according to
philosophical and social scientific insights, for articulating the
implicit and unspecified contextual presumptions and choices
made in counterfactual applications. Regardless of which
evaluation approach to counterfactuals one takes, this set of
principles could help researchers to conduct interdisciplinary
conversations and become aware of the potential harms and
ethical impacts of their counterfactual thinking as it pertains to
the social world. We think this set of principles is an example
of how to establish a successful interdisciplinary conversation
between machine learning researchers and social scientists,
philosophers, and ethicists.
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